Remote Desktop security

RDP Brute Force Protection

An RDP server reachable from the internet is probed by automated password-guessing tools around the clock. Strong passwords and lockout policies slow attackers down; a second factor on the phone stops them, because a correct password is no longer enough to open the session.

Allow or Deny prompt on the Spriv app for a Remote Desktop login attempt
A guessed password still meets the phone
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Default RDP port scanned by attack tools
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Separate channels an attacker must beat
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Typical second-factor time for real users
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Taps for a user on a trusted pair
The threat

Why attackers brute force Remote Desktop

RDP hands whoever logs in a full interactive desktop. That makes a single working password one of the most valuable things an attacker can find.

Password guessing at scale

Scanners find RDP listeners on the internet and try common usernames with long password lists, hour after hour. Weak or default passwords on any account eventually fall.

Credential stuffing with leaked passwords

Passwords stolen from unrelated breaches are replayed against RDP. If a user reused a password, the attacker logs in on the first try and no lockout policy ever fires.

A foothold for ransomware

Once inside a server, an attacker can disable defenses, move to other machines and deploy ransomware. Stopping the login stops everything that would have followed it.

Hardening checklist

How to protect RDP from brute force attacks

No single control is enough. Layer these, and put the second factor on top so that the password stops being the last line of defense.

Don't expose RDP directly

Put Remote Desktop behind a VPN or a Remote Desktop Gateway, and restrict who can reach it with firewall rules or IP allowlists.

Enforce strong passwords and lockout

Long, unique passwords and an account lockout policy slow guessing down. They do nothing against a password that was already leaked.

Limit who can use RDP

Grant Remote Desktop rights only to accounts that need them, and remove access when people change roles or leave.

Enable Network Level Authentication

NLA requires users to authenticate before a full session is created, which reduces the load and exposure of the login screen.

Patch and monitor

Keep Windows updated against vulnerabilities in the RDP service, and alert on bursts of failed logins.

Add multi factor authentication

Require a second factor on a separate channel, so a guessed or stolen password alone can't open a session.

Know what MFA covers. A second factor protects the login. Vulnerabilities in the RDP service itself are fixed by patching, which is why MFA sits on top of the checklist rather than replacing it.
Where Spriv fits

How Spriv stops RDP brute force logins

STEP 01

The password is only half

Spriv's Credential Provider adds a second factor to the Windows login screen. Even a correct password still needs the user's paired phone.

STEP 02

The attacker's location doesn't match

Adaptive authentication checks that the phone and the computer are in the same place. An attacker somewhere else fails that check, so their login is never approved automatically.

STEP 03

The user sees the attempt

An Allow / Deny prompt shows the username, IP address and server name, so an unexpected request is easy to spot and deny.

Quiet logins make attacks loud. Because real users clear in the background, they rarely see a prompt. When one does appear, it stands out instead of being approved out of habit. In the MFA comparison table, Spriv's adaptive MFA covers brute force, key logging, phishing and stolen phones.
Questions

RDP brute force questions

Does changing the RDP port stop brute force attacks?

It reduces noise from the simplest scanners, but attackers scan every port. Treat it as housekeeping, not protection, and rely on network restrictions and a second factor instead.

Isn't an account lockout policy enough?

Lockout slows guessing, but it can also be used to lock legitimate users out, and it never triggers when the attacker already has the right password from a breach. MFA closes that gap.

What can an administrator do during an attack?

Set the targeted user's status to Deny or Locked in the Spriv control panel, and review the attempt details the push notification reported.

Will MFA slow down my own admins?

Not on a trusted workstation-and-phone pair: the second factor clears in the background, often in about 175 milliseconds. Windows login MFA.

Checkit!

Make a guessed password worthless

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